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before the court to outweigh the importance of maintaining the
confidentiality established by W.Va. Code, 27-3-1(a) [1977].527
VI. DOMESTIC
A.

RELATIONS

Civil Child Abuse and Neglect

The case of In Interest of S.C. 52 a required Justice McHugh to examine
issues regarding the burden of proof in civil child abuse and neglect proceedings.
Justice McHugh held that
W.Va. Code, 49-6-2(c) [1980], requires the State Department of
Welfare, in a child abuse or neglect case, to prove "conditions
existing at the time of the filing of the petition.., by clear and
convincing proof." The statute, however, does not specify any
particular manner or mode of testimony or evidence by which the
State Department of Welfare is obligated to meet this burden.529
Justice McHugh concluded in In Interest of S.C. that "[e]ven when an
improvement period is granted, the burden of proof in a child neglect or abuse case
does not shift from the State Department of Welfare to the parent, guardian or
custodian of the child.
It remains upon the State Department of Welfare throughout
5 30
the proceedings.
Justice McHugh addressed terminating parental rights due to neglect or
abuse in Interest of DarlaB.5 31 The court held initially that
[t]he decision of a circuit court terminating the rights of parents to
their child pursuant to W.Va. Code, 49-6-5 [1977], will not be
reversed by this Court for failure to grant the parents an
improvement period, where the evidence supports a finding that
the child, 38 days old, suffered from life-threatening injuries in the
form of broken bones and bruises, which could not have occurred
in the manner testified to by the parents, and the circuit court
found "compelling circumstances" for the termination of parental
rights. 32
Justice McHugh concluded in DarlaB. that
527

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

528

284 S.E.2d 867 (W. Va. 1981).

529

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

530

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

531

331 S.E.2d 868 (W. Va. 1985).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

532

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 10

A TRIBUTE TO THOMAS E.McHUGH

Special]

[t]he granting of an improvement period, pursuant to W.Va. Code,
49-6-2(b) [1980] and W.Va. Code, 49-6-5(c) [1977], unless
otherwise provided by the laws of this State, is not an alternative
disposition where a finding is made pursuant to W.Va. Code,
49-6-5(a)(6) [1977] that there is "no reasonable likelihood that the
conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the
near future," and, pursuant to W.Va. Code, 49-6-2(b) [1980],
"compelling circumstances" justify a denial thereof.5 '
Justice McHugh outlined the responsibilities of guardian ad litems to
children in abuse and neglect proceedings in the case of In re Jeffrey R.L.34 The
decision stated:
Each child in an abuse and neglect case is entitled to effective
representation of counsel. To further that goal, W.Va. Code,
49-6-2(a) [1992] mandates that a child has a right to be
represented by counsel in every stage of abuse and neglect
proceedings. Furthermore, Rule XIII of the West Virginia Rules
for Trial Courts of Record provides that a guardian ad litem shall
make a full and independent investigation of the facts involved in
the proceeding, and shall make his or her recommendations
known to the court. Rules 1.1 and 1.3 of the West Virginia Rules
of Professional Conduct, respectively, require an attorney to
provide competent representation to a client, and to act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. The
Guidelines for Guardians Ad Litem in Abuse and Neglect cases,
which are adopted in this opinion and attached as Appendix A, are
in harmony with the applicable provisions of the West Virginia
Code, the West Virginia Rules for Trial Courts of Record, and the
West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, and provide
attorneys who serve as guardians ad litem with direction as to
their duties in representing the best interests of the children for
whom they are appointed.Justice McHugh was called upon in State ex rel. S.C. v. Chafine 6 to further
delineate the duties of officials when a child is brought into custody pursuant to the
abuse and neglect statutes. The court held:
W.Va. Code, 49-6-3(b) [1992] provides that, whether or not the
court orders immediate transfer of custody as provided in W.Va.
533

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

534

435 S.E.2d 162 (W. Va. 1993).

535

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

536

444 S.E.2d 62 (W. Va. 1994).
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Code, 49-6-3(a) [1992], if the court finds that there exists
imminent danger to the child, the court may schedule a
preliminary hearing. If at the preliminary hearing the court finds
there to be no alternative less drastic than removal of the child
from his or her home, the court may order that the child be
delivered into the temporary custody of the Department of Health
and Human Resources or some other designated person for a
period not exceeding sixty days. Furthermore, if, pursuant to
W.Va. Code, 49-6-2 [1992], the court finds the child to be abused
or neglected, then both the Department of Health and Human
Resources and the court, no later than sixty days after the child is
placed in the temporary custody of the Department of Health and
Human Resources, are to proceed with the disposition of the child,
in compliance with W.Va. Code, 49-6-5 [1992]. W.Va. Code,
49-6-5(a) [1992] requires the Department of Health and Human
Resources to file with the court a copy of the child's case plan,
including the permanency plan for the child. W. Va. Code,
49-6-5(a) [1992] defines a case plan as a written document which
includes, where applicable, the requirements of a family case plan,
as set forth in W.Va. Code, 49-6D-3 [1984], as well as the
additional requirements set forth in W.Va. Code, 49-6-5(a) [1992].
Furthermore, W.Va. Code, 49-6-5(a) [1992] requires the court to
proceed to disposition, one of those being, if the court finds the
abusing parent(s) unwilling or unable to provide adequately for
the child's needs, the court may commit the child temporarily to
the custody of the Department of Health and Human Resources.537
In Chafin, Justice McHugh also held that
W.Va. Code, 49-6-8(a) [1992] provides that if, twelve months
after receiving physical custody of a child, the Department of
Health and Human Resources has not placed the child in
permanent foster care, in an adoptive home or with a natural
parent, the Department of Health and Human Resources shall file
with the circuit court a petition for review of the case as well as a
report detailing the efforts which have been made to place the
child in a permanent home and copies of the child's case plan
including the permanency plan. W.Va. Code, 49-6-8(a) [1992]
further requires the circuit court to schedule a hearing to review
the child's case, to determine whether and under what conditions
the child's commitment to the Department of Health and Human
Resources shall continue, and to determine what efforts are
necessary to provide the child with a permanent home. At the
conclusion of the hearing the circuit court shall enter an
Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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appropriate order of disposition, in accordance with the best
interests of the child. Under W.Va. Code, 49-6-8(a) [1992], the
court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over cases reviewed
under this section for so long as a child remains in temporary
foster care.Y
Justice McHugh continued in Chafin by holding that
[t]he purpose of the child's case plan is the same as the family
case plan, except that the focus of the child's case plan is on the
child rather than the family unit. The child's case plan is to
include, where applicable, the requirements of a family case plan,
as set forth in W.Va. Code, 49-6-5(a) [1992] and 49-6D-3(a)
[1984], as well as the additional requirements articulated in W.Va.
Code, 49-6-5(a). 3 9
Justice McHugh further stated:
W.Va. Code, 49-6-8(d) [1992] requires the Department of Health
and Human Resources to file a report with the circuit court in any
case where any child in the temporary or permanent custody of the
Department of Health and Human Resources receives more than
three placements in one year no later than thirty days after the
third placement. 4
Justice McHugh wrote in Matter of Taylor B.54 1 that
[a] civil child abuse and neglect petition instituted by the West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources pursuant to
[W.Va.] Code, 49-6-1 et seq., is not subject to dismissal pursuant
to the terms of a plea bargain between a county prosecutor and a
criminal defendant in a related child abuse prosecution.54 2

B.

ChildSupport
Justice McHugh held in Hopkins v. Yarbrough4 3 that

538

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

539

Id. at Syl.

540

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

541

491 S.E.2d 607 (W. Va. 1997).

542

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

,543

284 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1981).

Pt. 4.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol102/iss5/10

4

Davis and Palmer: Domestic Relations
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102

[i]n the absence of fraud or other judicially cognizable and
harmful circumstance in the procurement of a decree for child
support, a circuit court is without authority to modify or cancel
arrearages of a former husband's child support payments, which
payments accrued prior to the date of the adoption of such
children by the wife's subsequent husband. 54 4
Justice McHugh confronted the issue of maintaining an action for child
support when child support is not addressed in a divorce decree in the case of
Hartley v. Ungvari.54 5 Justice McHugh said in Hartley that
[u]nder the provisions of W.Va. Code, 48-2-15 [1980], where a
divorce is granted upon constructive service of process and the
divorce order grants custody of a child but makes no further
provision for the support of that child, the custodial parent may
maintain an action against the noncustodial parent, upon obtaining
personal jurisdiction thereof, for reimbursement of reasonable past
support expenditures furnished to the child by the custodial parent
since the divorce unless, because of circumstances, the custodial
parent is estopped from asserting the action. 5
In Lambert v. Miller,54 7 Justice McHugh stated that "[a] child support
order may be modified only upon a substantial change of circumstances which was
uncontemplated by either of the parties at the time the order was entered and upon a
showing that the benefit of the child requires such modification. "54
Justice McHugh also held:
Remarriage of a divorced parent, standing alone, is not sufficient
to justify modification of a child support order. It is, however, a
circumstance that may be considered in weighing the equities of
the situation, where other factors are present which may warrant
the trial court, in its sound discretion, to modify the order. 54 9
Justice McHugh stated in Holley v. Holley 50 that
[w]hen a family law master or a circuit court enters an order
544

Id. at Syl. (citation omitted).

545

318 S.E.2d 634 (W. Va. 1984).

546

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

547

358 S.E.2d 785 (W. Va. 1987).

548

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

549

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

550

382 S.E.2d 590 (W. Va. 1989).
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awarding or modifying child support, the amount of the child
support shall be in accordance with the established state
guidelines, set forth in 6 W.Va. Code of State Rules §§ 78-16-1 to
78-16-20 (1988), unless the master or the court sets forth, in
writing, specific reasons for not following the guidelines in the
particular case involved.55'
Justice McHugh held in Scott v. Wagoner5 52 that
[i]n a case involving child support, if compelling equitable
considerations are present, under the provisions of W.Va. Code,
48-2-15(e), as amended, a court has the authority to enforce the
child support obligation as a lien against the deceased obligor's
estate. To the extent that Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W.Va. 5160,
50 S.E.2d 455 (1948), is inconsistent herewith, it is overruled. 3
Justice McHugh stated in Soriano v. Soriano554 that
[i]n a case where the dependency exemption is allocated, that is,
where a trial court requires the custodial parent to execute the
necessary waiver pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 152(e)(2)(A), as
amended, the trial court should set forth its reasons for doing so in
the order awarding child support. These reasons should clearly
demonstrate that it is more equitable to allocate the dependency
exemption to the noncustodial parent than it would be to allow the
custodial parent to claim the dependency exemption. 5 5
Justice McHugh discussed the form which payments to third parties may
take in a divorce action in the case of Sly v. Sly. 55 6 Justice McHugh stated initially:
W.Va. Code, 48-2-15(b)(4) [1991] provides that if the circuit
court, upon ordering a divorce, requires payments to third parties
in the form of home loan installments, land contract payments,
rent, payments for utility services, property taxes, insurance
coverage, or other expenses reasonably necessary for the use and
occupancy of the marital domicile, those payments shall be
deemed to be alimony, child support or installment payments for
551

Id. at Syl. (citation omitted).

552

400 S.E.2d 556 (W. Va. 1990).

553

id. at Syl.

554

400 S.E.2d 546 (W. Va. 1990).

555

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

556

416 S.E.2d 486 (W. Va. 1992).
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the distribution of marital property in such proportion as the
circuit court may direct. W.Va. Code, 48-2-15(b)(4) [1991] further
provides that if the circuit court does not set forth in the order that
a portion of such payments are deemed to be child support or
installment payments for the distribution of marital property, then
all such payments shall be deemed to be alimony.557
The court concluded in Sly that
[w]here the circuit court, though not specifically using the term
"child support," sets up a house payment provision in the final
divorce decree to serve as child support for the minor child or
children of the divorcing parties, such a provision shall be deemed
58
to be child support under W.Va. Code, 48-2-15(b)(4) [1991].
Justice McHugh observed in Robinson v. McKinney559 that "[t]he ten-year
statute of limitations set forth in W.Va. Code, 38-3-18 [1923] and not the doctrine
of laches applies when enforcing a decretal judgment which orders the payment of
monthly sums for alimony or child support. ' 56 0 Justice McHugh held next in
Robinson that "[i]n order to ensure that the best interests of the child are
considered, ordinarily an agreement to modify or terminate a child support
obligation is effective only upon entry of a court order, authorized by W. Va. Code,
561
48-2-15(3) [1991], which modifies or terminates the child support obligation.In Costello v. McDonald562 Justice McHugh wrote:
It is presumed that when the obligor fails to make his or her child
support payments as ordered, the obligee assumed that additional
burden in such a manner so as to protect the welfare of the child,
and, therefore, in the event the obligee dies, his or her estate is
entitled to recoup from the obligated party the child support
arrearage which accrued prior to the death of the obligee. This
presumption may be rebutted if the court makes written findings
on the record that there is clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
that the welfare of the child for whom the child support payments
were ordered, was adversely affected or would be adversely
affected if the child support arrearage is given to the obligee's
estate. Whether the presumption has been rebutted is within the
557
558

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

559

432 S.E.2d 543 (W. Va. 1993).

560

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

561

Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.

562

473 S.E.2d 736 (W. Va. 1996).
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sound discretion of the court and will have to be determined on a
case-by-case basis. If the presumption is rebutted, then the court
must determine the amount of child support arrearage which
should be given to the child in order to ensure that the child has
suitable shelter, food, clothing, medical attention, education, and
maintenance in the station of life he or she is accustomed to
living. If, however, the child becomes emancipated or reaches the
age of majority, then the court must determine the amount of child
support arrearage which should be awarded in order to ensure that
the emancipated child or the child who has attained the age of
majority is put in the same position as he or she would have been
had the child support been timely paid. Furthermore, if a minor
child is involved, then the court must outline a procedure whereby
it is ensured that the minor child receives the benefits of the child
support arrearage.5s
564
Justice McHugh held in Carterv. Carter.

Even though a custodial parent has interfered with or discouraged
visitation between a noncustodial parent and the parties' children,
a trial court may not reduce the amount of child support arrearages
owed by the noncustodial parent in order to punish the custodial
parent for such interference or discouragement of visitation. s
C.

Child Custody
Justice McHugh stated in Phillips v. Phillips5 66 that
[u]pon a petition seeking a change in the custody arrangement of a
child from joint custody to sole custody, the primary criterion
considered by a circuit court or family law master should be the
best interests of the child and the mutual ability of the parties in
reaching shared decisions with respect to those interests,
and not
567
solely whether a change in circumstances has occurred.
Justice McHugh held in Sams v. BostonW68 that

563

Id. at Syl.

564

479 S.E.2d 681 (W. Va. 1996).

565

1& at Syl. PL 3..

666

425 S.E.2d 834 (W. Va. 1992).

567

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

568

384 S.E.2d 151 (W. Va. 1989).
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[a] state remains the "home state" of the children, for purposes of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, specifically, W.Va.
Code, 48-10-2(5) and 48-10-3(a)(1) [1981], and for purposes of
the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act, specifically, 28 U.S.C. §
1738A(b)(4) and § 1738A(c)(2)(A) (1982), for a reasonable period
of time, where the children have been abducted to and concealed
in another state by one of the parents.569
D.

Child Visitation

In Ledsome v. Ledsome,570 Justice McHugh held that "[a] court, in
defining a parent's right to visitation, is charged with giving paramount
consideration to the welfare of the child involved.",571 Ledsome also addressed the
relationship of child support payments on a parent's right of child visitation. Justice
McHugh held in Ledsome that
[t]he right of a parent, not in custody of his or her child, to visit
that child may not ordinarily be made dependent upon the
payment of child support by that parent. However, when a court
finds that the parent's refusal to make child support payments is
contumacious, or willful or intentional, that parent's visitation
rights may be reduced or denied, if the welfare of the child so
requires.572
Justice McHugh took up the right of grandparents to visit grandchildren in
Petition of Nearhoof.573 He said initially that "[a] trial court, in considering a
petition of a grandparent for visitation rights with a grandchild or grandchildren
pursuant to W.Va. Code, 48-2-15(b)(1) [1986] or W.Va. Code, 48-2B-1 [1980],
shall give paramount consideration to the best interests of the grandchild or
grandchildren involved., 574 Justice McHugh then stated:
Upon the petition of a grandparent, pursuant to W.Va. Code,
48-2B-1 [1980], seeking visitation rights with a grandchild or
grandchildren, who is the child or are the children of the
grandparent's deceased child, a trial court may order that the
grandparent shall have reasonable and seasonable visitation rights
with the grandchild or grandchildren provided such visitation is in
569

Id. at Syl.

570

301 S.E.2d 475 (W. Va. 1983).

571

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

572

573

359 S.E.2d 587 (W. Va. 1987).

574

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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the best interest of the grandchild or grandchildren involved, even
though the grandchild or grandchildren has or have been adopted
by the spouse of the deceased child's former spouse. 57 5
Justice McHugh was called upon to confront the impact of allegations of
child sexual abuse on child visitation during divorce proceedings in the case of
Mary D. v. Watt.57 6 The court held initially:
Because an allegation of sexual abuse of a child involved in a
divorce proceeding is extraordinary, such allegation would
constitute "good cause" or grounds for a more expeditious
resolution by the circuit court as contemplated by W.Va. Code,
48A-4-1(i) [1991], and accordingly, custody and visitation matters
relating thereto may be retained by the circuit court, or, if already
referred to a family law master, such referral may be revoked. 57 7
Justice McHugh then held:
Prior to ordering supervised visitation pursuant to W.Va. Code,
48-2-15(b)(1) [1991], if there is an allegation involving whether
one of the parents sexually abused the child involved, a family law
master or circuit court must make a finding with respect to
whether that parent sexually abused the child. A finding that
sexual abuse has occurred must be supported by credible
evidence. The family law master or circuit court may condition
such supervised visitation upon the offending parent seeking
treatment. Prior to ordering supervised visitation, the family law
master or circuit court should weigh the risk of harm of such
visitation or the deprivation of any visitation to the parent who
allegedly committed the sexual abuse against the risk of harm of
such visitation to the child. Furthermore, the family law master or
circuit court should ascertain that the allegation of sexual abuse
under these circumstances is meritorious and if made in the
context of the family law proceeding, that such allegation is
reported to the appropriate law enforcement agency or prosecutor
for the county in which the alleged sexual abuse took place.
Finally, if the sexual abuse allegations were previously tried in a
criminal case, then the transcript of the criminal case may be
utilized to determine whether credible evidence exists to support
the allegations. If the transcript is utilized to determine that
credible evidence does or does not exist, the transcript must be
made a part of the record in the civil proceeding so that this Court,
575

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

576

438 S.E.2d 521 (W. Va. 1992).
ld. at Syl. Pt. 1.

s77
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where appropriate, may adequately review the civil record to
conclude whether the lower court abused its discretion. 78
Justice McHugh concluded in Mary D. that
[w]here supervised visitation is ordered pursuant to W.Va. Code,
48-2-15(b)(1) [1991], the best interests of a child include
determining that the child is safe from the fear of emotional and
psychological trauma which he or she may experience. The
person(s) appointed to supervise the visitation should have had
some prior contact with the child so that the child is sufficiently
familiar with and trusting of that person in order for the child to
have secure feelings and so that the visitation is not harmful to his
or her emotional well being. Such a determination should be
incorporated as a finding of the family law master or circuit
court.579
E.

Paternity

In State ex rel. J.L.K. v. R.AI.

58 0
1

Justice McHugh held:

A woman, who conceived a child while she was married, but gave
birth to the child while she was unmarried, may not obtain a
warrant, pursuant to W.Va. Code, 48-7-1 [1969], accusing a
person other than her former husband of being the father of the
child if she has not lived separate and apart from her former
husband for a space of one year or more prior to the birth of the
child. 81
Justice McHugh indicated in State ex rel. Division of Human Services v.
Benjamin P.B.s8 2 that
[t]he dismissal with prejudice of a paternity action initiated by a
mother against a putative father of a child does not preclude the
child, under the principle of res judicata, from bringing a second
action to determine paternity when the evidence does not show
privity between the mother and the child in the original action nor
does the evidence indicate that the child was either a party to the
original action or represented by counsel or guardian ad litem in
578

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

579

Id. at Syl. PL 3.

580

294 S.E.2d 142 (W. Va. 1982).

581

Id. at Syl.

582

395 S.E.2d 220 (W. Va. 1990).
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that action.583
5 4
Justice McHugh indicated in Nancy Darlene M. v. James Lee M., Jr.,9

that
[a]n adjudication of paternity, which is expressed in a divorce
order, is res judicata as to the husband and wife in any subsequent
proceeding. Therefore, the provisions of W.Va. Code, 48A-7-26
[1986], part of the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act, W.Va. Code, 48A-7-1 to 48A-7-41, as amended,
which authorizes the adjudication of paternity under certain
circumstances is not applicable if an adjudication of paternity is
expressed in the divorce order.585
F.

Terminationof ParentalRights

The issue of termination of parental rights in Nancy Viola R. v. Randolph
W.5 86 turned on the father's conviction for the murder of the child's mother. Justice
McHugh held that "[a] conviction of first degree murder of a child's mother by his
father and the father's prolonged incarceration in a penal institution for that
conviction are significant factors to be considered in ascertaining the father's
fitness and 87
in determining whether the father's parental rights should be
terminated."
Justice McHugh also said that "[w]here parental rights of a father have
been terminated because of his conviction of the first degree murder of the child's
mother, and other acts of violence to her and threats of violence to the child,
permanent guardianship may be given to the West Virginia Department of Human
Services.""8 8
Termination of parental rights, due to inaction by a parent to abuse of the
child, was addressed by Justice McHugh in Matter of Scottie D.5 89 Justice McHugh
held:
Termination of parental rights of a parent of an abused child is
authorized under W.Va. Code, 49-6-1 to 49-6-10, as amended,
where such parent contends nonparticipation in the acts giving rise
to the termination petition but there is clear and convincing
5B3

Il at Syl. Pt 5.

584

400 S.E.2d 882 (W. Va. 1990).

585

ld.
at Syl. PL 1.

586

356 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1987).

587

Id.at Syl. Pt. 2.

M

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3 (citation omitted).

589

406 S.E.2d 214 (W. Va. 1991).
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evidence that such nonparticipating parent knowingly took no
action to prevent or stop such acts to protect the child.
Furthermore, termination of parental rights of a parent of an
abused child is authorized under W.Va. Code, 49-6-1 to 49-6-10,
as amended, where such nonparticipating parent supports the other
parent's version as to how a child's injuries occurred, but there is
clear and convincing evidence that such version is inconsistent
with the medical evidence.590
In Scottie D., Justice McHugh also addressed the role of a guardian ad
litem in termination proceedings. Justice McHugh stated:
In a proceeding to terminate parental rights pursuant to W.Va.
Code, 49-6-1 to 49-6-10, as amended, a guardian ad litem,
appointed pursuant to W.Va. Code, 49-6-2(a), as amended, must
exercise reasonable diligence in carrying out the responsibility of
protecting the rights of the children. This duty includes exercising
the appellate rights of the children, if, in the reasonable judgment
of the guardian ad litem, an appeal is necessary. 591
Justice McHugh indicated in In re Jeffrey R.L.592 that
[p]arental rights may be terminated where there is clear and
convincing evidence that the infant child has suffered extensive
physical abuse while in the custody of his or her parents, and there
is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse can be
substantially corrected because the perpetrator of the abuse has not
been identified and the parents, even in the face of knowledge of
the abuse, have taken no action to identify the abuser. 93
G.

Adoption
The case of West Virginia Department of Human Services v. La Rea Ann

C.L.594 involved a teenager who sought to relinquish parental rights to her child.
Justice McHugh noted initially that
[t]he effect of W.Va. Code, 49-3-1(a) [1977, 1984] and of the
proviso to W.Va. Code, 48-4-la [1965] (now W.Va. Code,
590

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

591

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

592

435 S.E.2d 162 (W. Va. 1993).

593

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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332 S.E.2d 632 (W. Va. 1985).
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48-4-5(a) [1984]) is, ordinarily, to make revocable any
relinquishment of child custody by a minor parent to a licensed
private child welfare agency or to the West Virginia Department
of Human Services which has not yet been approved by a court of
competent jurisdiction. 595
The court then held:
Where the child has spent a substantial period of time in the home
of foster parents, pending a ruling by the trial court on whether to
approve a minor parent's relinquishment of child custody to a
licensed private child welfare agency or to the West Virginia
Department of Human Services, extraordinary circumstances exist
which demand that the best interests of the child not only be
considered but be given primary importance. In such a case the
minor parent's right to revoke his or her relinquishment ceases to
be absolute,
due to the passage of the unreasonable period of
5 96
time.

H.

Modification ofDivorceDecree

Justice McHugh stated in Segal v. Beard5 97 that "[a] family law master
lacks jurisdiction to hear a petition for modification of an order when the
modification proceeding does not involve child custody, child visitation, child
support or spousal support." 598
The court also held that "[a] circuit court lacks jurisdiction under W.Va.
Code, 48-2-15(e) [1986] to modify a divorce decree when the modification
proceeding does not involve alimony, child support or child custody."'5 99 Justice
McHugh concluded in Segal that
[t]he ten-day period for filing a petition for review of a family law
master's recommended decision, W.Va. Code, 48A-4-7(a) [1986],
is tolled until an aggrieved party is served with notice of the filing
of the recommended decision. The family law master must serve
notice of the filing of the recommended decision. 6 °

595

Mdat Syl. Pt. 1.

596

Id.at Syl. Pt. 2.

597

380 S.E.2d 444 (W. Va. 1989).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 1 (citation omitted).

598

599
600

1& at Syl. Pt. 2.
Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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In Blevins v. Shelton6 1 Justice McHugh ruled that
[a] circuit court lacks jurisdiction under W.Va. Code, 48-2-15(e),
as amended, to modify a divorce decree by awarding rent,
retroactively or prospectively, to a former spouse who is a
co-owner of the marital home which is occupied under the divorce
decree by the other former spouse and one or more of their minor
children, when the rent is sought solely because a new spouse is
also residing in the marital home.60 2
I.

Annulment of Marriage

In Harvey v. Harvey603 Justice McHugh addressed the issue of obtaining an
annulment due to a bigamous marriage. Justice McHugh held:
Pursuant to W.Va. Code, 48-2-1 [1935], bigamous marriages are
"void from the time they are so declared by a decree of nullity."
To obtain an annulment of a bigamous marriage, an order or
decree must be entered in a court of competent jurisdiction
declaring the nullity. Orders merely setting forth the conviction
and sentence of a defendant for the felony offense of bigamy
under W.Va. Code, 61-8-1 [1931], are not sufficient standing
alone to constitute an annulment of a bigamous marriage.604
J.

Alimony

Justice McHugh relied upon the decision of F.C. v. LV.C. 6 5 to address
alimony issues in Crutchfield v. Crutchfield.0 6 Justice McHugh held in Crutchfield
that "[a]limony may be awarded under W. Va. Code, 48-2-4(a)(7) against a
'faultless' party if 'principles of justice' so require, considering the financial needs
of the parties and other factors listed in [W.Va.] Code, 48-2-16. ,6o7 The ruling in
Crutchfield was inconsistent with a previous decision by the court. Therefore,
Justice McHugh went on in Crutchfield to hold that "[tlhe Syllabus of Dyer v.
Tsapis, 162 W.Va. 289, 249 S.E.2d 509 (1978), is modified in that W.Va. Code,

601

383 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 1989).

602

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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298 S.E.2d 467 (W. Va. 1982).
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Id. at Syl.
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300 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va. 1982).
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302 S.E.2d 76 (W. Va. 1983).
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Id. at Syl. Pt. 1 (citation omitted).
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48-2-4(a)(7), does not condition an award of alimony upon a finding of fault., 60 8
Two issues involving alimony were addressed by Justice McHugh in Zirkle
v. Zirkle.60 9 The court held initially in the opinion that
[a]bsent a court order, augmented black lung benefits received by
an ex-spouse pursuant to Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969, as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq., and
20 C.F.R. §§ 725 et seq., after an alimony award has been ordered
by a court, which court did not consider such benefits, may not be
deducted from an 61
alimony
obligation by the ex-spouse ordered to
0
pay such alimony.
Justice McHugh next held in Zirkle that
[a]rrearages of alimony, per se, is not a sufficient ground for a
court to refuse to consider a petition for modification of alimony
unless the court determines that the ex-spouse had the ability to
comply with the order awarding alimony and the failure to pay the
arrearages was contumacious, or willful or intentional or
otherwise in contempt of court.611
Justice McHugh held in Peremba v. Peremba612 that "[w]hen alimony is
sought under W.Va. Code, 48-2-4(a)(7), the court may consider substantial
inequitable conduct on the part of the party seeking alimony as one factor in its
decision. Substantial inequitable conduct is 613
conduct which the trier of fact may
infer caused the dissolution of the marriage.',
In Sauls v. Howell,614 Justice McHugh held that
[m]atured, unpaid installments provided for in a decree of divorce,
which decree ordered a husband to pay to his former wife $2,700,
"in lieu of alimony"at $150 per month, stand as decretal
judgments against the husband, and the wife is entitled to institute
suggestion proceedings under W.Va. Code, 38-5-10 [1931], to
recover upon those judgments, and she need not institute ancillary
proceedings to reduce the amount of those judgments to a sum

608

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2 (citation omitted).

609
610

304 S.E.2d 664 (W. Va. 1983).

611

Id. at Syl. Pt 2.
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304 S.E.2d 880 (W. Va. 1983).

613

Id. at Syl. Pt 1.
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309 S.E.2d 26 (W. Va. 1983).
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certain. 615
K.

Cohabitationand Common Law Marriage

Justice McHugh held in Goode v. Goode6 16 that "[p]ursuant to the
statutory requirements of W.Va. Code, 48-1-5 [1969], every marriage in this state
must be solemnized under a license. Therefore, the validity of a common-law
marriage is not recognized.

' 617

Justice McHugh also said:

A court may order a division of property acquired by a man and
woman who are unmarried cohabitants, but who have considered
themselves and held themselves out to be husband and wife. Such
order may be based upon principles of contract, either express or
implied, or upon a constructive trust. Factors to be considered in
ordering such a division of property may include: the purpose,
duration, and stability of the relationship and the expectations of
the parties. Provided, however, that if either the man or woman is
validly married to another person during the period of
cohabitation, the property rights of the spouse and support rights
of the children of such man or woman shall not in any way be
adversely affected by such division of property.6 18
L.

Committee for Incompetent
Justice McHugh noted in Old National Bank of Martinsburg v.

Hendricks61 9 that "W.Va. Code, 27-11-4 [1974] creates a fiduciary relationship
between a committee, appointed to manage the estate of an incompetent, and the
incompetent, for whom the committee is appointed. 620 The court also held:
When the sales price of an incompetent's real estate is increased,
beyond that obtained by the committee, to its fair market value,
through the efforts of an interested person, then that interested
person is entitled to attorney's fees, pursuant to W.Va. Code,
37-1-15 [1959], based upon the efforts to increase the sales price,
in an amount which is reasonable and just. In that situation,
attorney's fees awardable pursuant to W.Va. Code, 37-1-15 [1959]
shall be charged against the compensation of the committee and
615

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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396 S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1990).
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not against the estate itself.

Justice McHugh held in Sowa v. Huffinan6r that "[t]he duties of a
guardian ad litem, who is appointed pursuant to W.Va. Code, 27-11-1(b) [1990] to
represent an alleged incompetent in a competency proceeding,
end when the
623
Committee is appointed and the appeal period has expired.
VII. PROPERTY LAW

A.

Eminent Domain

Use of the prior purchase price of property in an eminent domain
proceeding was addressed by Justice McHugh in West Virginia Department of
Highways v. Mountain Inc. 624 In that opinion Justice McHugh held:
In an eminent domain proceeding to take private property for
public use the purchase price of the property approximately four
and a half years prior to the filing of such proceeding is not
admissible when there has been a showing that a substantial
change in the physical characteristics of the property has occurred
since the sale took place and the original purchase price is not
probative
of the fair market value of the property at the time of the
625
taking.

626 Justice
In the case of West Virginia Departmentof Highways v. Fisher,
McHugh addressed the issue of jury bias or prejudice in an eminent domain
proceeding. The court held that

[i]n an eminent domain action, although all prospective jurors
stated that they could return a verdict free from bias or prejudice,
where the record indicates that [thirteen] prospective jurors were
acquainted with the landowners and/or their appraisal witnesses,
which witnesses testified at trial, and, of the petit jury selected
from those prospective jurors, six jurors were acquainted with the
landowners and/or such appraisal witnesses, a likelihood of bias or
prejudice on the part of the jury existed sufficient to require that

621

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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443 S.E.2d 262 (W. Va. 1994).
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